KDD Infrastructure - Yale University：KDD的基础设施-耶鲁大学.pptVIP

Towards an end-to-end architecture forhandling sensitive data Hector Garcia-Molina Rajeev Motwani and students DB Perspective Performance Preservation Distribution (P2P) Bad Guys: eavesdrop corrupt Trust DB Perspective Preservation Privacy Spectrum Prevention Detection Containment Prevention: Our Work Privacy-Preserving OLAP Distributed Architecture for Secure DBMS (P) Data Preservation in P2P Systems P2P Trust and Reputation Management (P) P2P Privacy Preserving Indexing (P) Distributed Architecturefor Secure DBMS Motivation: Outsourcing Secure Database Provider (SDP) Performance Problem The Power of Two Basic Idea Another Example The Power of Two Challenges Find a decomposition that Obeys all privacy constraints Minimizes execution cost for given workload For given query, find good plan Example Detection: Our Work Simulatable Auditing (P) k-Anonymity algorithms and hardness Containment: Our Work Paranoid Platform for Privacy Preferences (P) Entity Resolution Containment Trusting privacy policies Paranoid Example: Trusting Example P3P Policies: Current purpose: completion and support of the recurring subscription activity Recipients: DealsRUs and/or entities acting as their agents or entities for whom DealsRUs are acting as an agent... Example: Email P4P: Paranoid Platformfor Privacy Preferences Private Information Entity Resolution Applications: mailing lists, customer files, counter-terrorism, ... Privacy Leakage Multi-Record Leakage Q1: Added Vulnerability? Q2: Disinformation? Q3: Verification? Privacy Spectrum Prevention Detection Containment * 1 privacy + - preservation + - easy easy goal Encrypt Client ServiceProvider Encrypt Client Client-side Processor Query Q Q’ “Relevant Data” Answer Problem: Q’ ? “SELECT *” ServiceProvider Client DSP1 DSP2 { CC#, expDate, name } { expDate, name } { CC# } { salary } { rand } { salary + rand } DSP1 DSP2 Client-side Processor Query Q Q1 Q2 Key: Ensure Cost (Q1)+Cost (Q2) ? Cost (Q) R(id, a, b, c), privacy