财政分权 晋升激励与地方政府规模——基于地区差异视角的分析-fiscal decentralization promotion incentive and local government scale analysis based on regional differences.docxVIP

ABSTRACT This paper takes the cross-regional different impact of China’s Fiscal Decentralization on local governments’ size as research object. The significance of this study is finding the root causes of the cross-regional different impacts of China’s Fiscal Decentralization on local governments’ size and putting forward the accommodations to prevent irrational expansion of government size. Through the analysis of the system mechanism which lead to the discrepancy behaviors of local officials, this paper reveals the regional impact of fiscal decentralization on the local government size initially. At first, the paper introduces the research background, significance and the main research literature home and abroad in this field. The following chapter analyzes the theoretical basis of the cross-regional different impact of China’s Fiscal Decentralization on local governments’ size and discusses applicability of the Leviathan hypothesis in China. Based on the theoretical model which describes the behavior differences between officials, the paper explains the theoretical mechanism that causes the cross-regional different impact of China’s Fiscal Decentralization on local governments’ size. Then, this paper makes the empirical analysis of the cross-regional different impacts of China’s Fiscal Decentralization on local governments’ size, the empirical analysis’ results shows the cross-region differences is exist. The regional different exist in the promotion competition’s environment, fiscal expenditure pressure, fiscal transfer payment status , the Marketization degree, foreign investment capital, industrial structure and other influential factors led to the phenomenon that regional different impact of fiscal decentralization on the local governments happen. At last, The paper draws the main conclusion of this study and puts forward the policies to curb irrational expansion of the government size. For example, reform the official’s performance evaluation system, narro