基于EM与IR竞争的产品差异定价研究..docVIP

基于OEM与IR竞争的产品差异定价研究 孟丽君黄祖庆张宝友杨玉香 中国计量大学经济与管理学院 随着资源的匮乏和环境污染的加剧，越来越多的企业和消费者开始关注废旧产 品的冋收再制造，然而消费者对再制品的价值评估低于新品。本文针对“集成制 造商+独立再制造商”双寡头垄断市场竞争结构下新产品和再制品的差别定价问 题提出了两周期博弈模型，研宂结果表明：集成制造商可以通过第一周期对新品 的合理定价来引导第二周期市场竞争结构以及独立再制造商的盈利能力。数值试 验的结论则进一步验证了研究结论，并显示了独立再制造商的再制造成木优势、 客户对再制品的价值评估均能影响制造商的新品定价和两寡头各自的利润。 关键词： 再制品;定价策略;价值评估;博弈; 黄祖庆（1969-）,男（汉族），江西会昌人，中国计量大学经济与 管理学院教授，研究方向:逆向物流管理、供应链管理， Email:hzql210@163. com. 收稿曰期:2016-02-16 基金：浙江省自然科学基金青年项目（LQ16G020005） Optimal Pricing for New and Remanufactured Products Based on the Competition Between OEM and IR MENG Li—jun HUANG Zu-qing ZHANG Bao-you YANG Yu-xiang School ofEconomicsand Managemente^China Jiliang University; Abstract： The residual value inherent in used products can make remanufacturing aprofitable activity for OEMs, so many OEMS choose to sell remanufactured products. At the same time, there may be third-parties remanufacturers that remanufacture the used products originally sold by the OEM. However, in the academic field of closed-loop supply chain， thus far， few researches has been conducted on investigating the optimal pricing problem of new product and differentiated remanufactured product. In this paper, a two-period game-theoretic model with a monopolist manufacturer in the first period and duopoly of manufacturer and independent remanufacturer in the second period is developed.It is assumed that the OEM may remanufacture the used product returned by customer while manufacturing new product and the thirdparty remanufacturer competes with the manufacturer by remanufacturing the used product too. It is also assumed that customer’s willingness to pay for remanufactured products is less than their willingness to pay for new products. Based on these assumptions, a Stackelberg game is employed to analyzed the OEM and independent remanufacture s pricing strategies where the former act as the leader and the latter act as a follower. The optimal pricing strategies for the OEM and TR are obtained. The results suggest that, t