负债融资对我国上市公司投资行为影响的实证研究技术经济及管理专业论文.docxVIP

重庆大 重庆大学硕士学位论文 英文摘要 PAGE PAGE VI ABSTRACT Financing decision and investment decision are the core business activities of a company. Divided by MM theory, tradition corporate finance theory supposes that financing decision is absolutely independent of investment decision based on incomplete markets and information symmetry hypothesis, however MM separate principle doesn’t tell the truth of the real world. With the development of new system economics such as information economics, principal-agent theory and contract theory, more and more scholars pay attention to the conflicts of interest between relevant beneficiaries and information asymmetry. Modern corporate finance theory deems that enterprise a nexus of contracts, so interest conflicts between relevant beneficiaries of a company bring on agency cost. Jensen and Meckling defined agency cost as the sum of the monitoring expenditures by the principal, the bonding expenditures by the agent and the residual loss. There are two kinds of agency cost namely equity agency cost and debt agency cost distinguishing from capital structure. Interest conflicts between shareholder-creditors generate debt agency cost, and bring on asset substitution and under-investment; at the same time, contingent governance of debt financing reduces the conflicts between sharehold-manager and restricts over-investment generating from equity agency cost. First, this paper summarizes related literatures both in domestic and foreign, reviews basic financing and investment theory based on the tradition or modern corporate financing theory. Second, based on the new and shunt characteristic of Chinese capital market and the high ownership concentration, this paper reviews principal-agent theory on Berle-Means ownership diffusion model, and then builds a principal-agent framework under controlling shareholder’s control, give a normative study on the effect of debt financing on investment behavior of the listed companies. Finally, this paper studi