博弈论 完全信息静态博弈.pdf

Chapter 1 完全信息静态博弈完全信息静态博弈 Static Games of Compplete Information In this chapter we consider games of the followingfollowing simplesimple form:form: firstfirst, thethe playersplayers simultaneously choose actions; then, the pllayers receiive payoffffs ththatt ddependd on ththe combination of actions just chosen. Within the class of such static (or simultaneous-move) ggames,,we restrict attention to ggames of complete information. That is each player’s payoff function (the function that determines the players payoff from the combinationcombination ofof actionsactions chosenchosen byby thethe players)players) isis common knowledge among all the players. 教材教材P21P21 一、、NormalNormal-FormForm RepresentationRepresentation of Games and Nash Equilibrium ((一))Normal-Form Representatiion off GGames In the normal-form representation of a game ,each player simultaneously chooses a strategy, and the combinationcombination ofof strategiesstrategies chosenchosen byby thethe playersplayers determines a payoff for each player. We illustrate thethe normalnormal-formform representationrepresentation withwith aa classicalclassical example—The prisoners’ Dilemma. ＊＊TwoTwo suspectssuspects areare arrestedarrested andand chargedcharged withwith a crime. The police lack sufficient evidence to convictconvict thethe suspectssuspects, unlessunless atat leastleast oneone confesses.The police hold the suspects in separate cells and explaiin the consequences that will follow from the actions they could take. If neither confesses then both will be convicted of aa minorminor offenseoffense andand sentencedsentenced toto oneone yearyear inin jail.jail. If both confess then both will be sentenced to jailjail fivefive yearsyears. FinallyFinally, ifif oneone confessesconfesses butbut thethe other does not, then the confessor will be released iimmedidiattelyl bbutt ththe oth