CEO权力、员工分红与公司绩效-正修科技大学管理学院.PDFVIP

全球商業經營管理學報 CEO 權力、員工分紅與公司績效 第九期 106.09 98 ISSN ：2076-9474 CEO權力、員工分紅與公司績效 CEO Power, Employee Bonus, and Firm Performance 陳晏儀a 盧正治b 盧正壽c 摘要 本研究以1996 年至2015 年國內上市櫃公司為研究對象，主要探討CEO權力與員工分紅政策之間 關係，並研究分紅費用化新制是否影響有權力 CEO的員工分紅 決策，最後則釐清CEO權力如何影響 公司績效與員工分紅之間關係。實證結果發現，當公司CEO權力愈大，員工分紅水準愈高，顯示有權 力的CEO可能基於私利動機而傾向發放高額的分紅。另外員工分紅費用化新制確實能夠降低公司的員 工分紅水準，然而有權力CEO的員工分紅政策卻未受到分紅新制實施的影響，證實當公司 CEO權力 愈大，控制權愈高時，愈難受到外在制度的約束。此外員工分紅能夠提升公司的未來績效，說明員工 分紅是項有效的激勵制度。反觀 CEO 權力則會減損公司績效與員工分紅之間的正向連結，顯示 CEO 權力愈高，愈可能過度發放分紅，而浪費內部資源，並降低 公司績效。 關鍵詞： CEO權力、員工分紅、員工分紅費用化、公司績效 ABSTRACT This thesis examines listed firms in Taiwan from 1996 to 2015 to investigate the relationship between CEO power and employee bonus policy, and explore whether the expensing employee bonus policy has effects on the employee bonus decision of powerful CEO. Finally this paper demonstrates how CEO power influences the relationship between firm performance and employee bonus. The empirical results indicate that the more power the CEO, the higher bonus the employee, showing that the powerful CEOs tend to pay higher employee bonus based on private incentives. Furthermore, the implementation of expensing employee bonus policy can really reduce the level of employee bonus and enhance the firms future performance, however, it has no effects on powerful CEOs employee bonus decision indicating that powerful CEO are difficult to be monitor by the external system as his entrenchment controlling position. On the other hand, CEO power diminish the positive relationship between firm performance and employee bonus, indicating the more powerful CEOs tend to overpay employee bonus resulting in internal resources inefficiency and poor firm performance. Finally, the results also found that expensing employee bonus policy