基于供需合作的供应链质量风险控制研究企业管理专业论文.docxVIP

哈尔滨工业大学管理学硕士论文 哈尔滨工业大学管理学硕士论文 Abstract Abstract - - PAGE IV - -III- -III- Abstract With open degree getting higher, more foreign companies come into domestic market, it makes competition get more intense. In order to win in competition, domestic companies need to improve their competitive strength. The improve- ment not only depends on self-strength, but also depends on strength of entire supply chain which company lies in. Uncertain risks in supply chain weaken the competitive strength. Especially quality risk, it has been key factor affect efficiency of supply chain. Quality risk in supply chain can transfer from one company to the others, it is more important using co-operation to control risk besides self-struggling. Therefore, research on based on supplier-demander co-operation how to well control quality risk in supply chain has great significance. In this dissertation, firstly, divide quality risk in supply chain into two kinds: quality credit risk and quality technology risk, analyze each reasons. Then based on study done by Baiman on quality cost decision model, according to actual conditions in domestic supply chain, design two kinds of stimulate contract which let supplier and demander taking risk loss together, build utility function of each side seperately. Using static game theory, get equilibrium solution of each side under two contracts, it makes each side realize optimizing self-utility in game relationship. Change object function into entire utility function of supply chain, with design on taking rate of each side, realize maximizing entire utility of supply chain and stimulate both sides controlling quality credit risk actively. Based on study done by Monzka on degree of supplier early involvement, study on choosing tactics of involvement degree further, in order to supplement quality communication defect. According to differences in manufacturer attitude to sharing knowledge and sharing ways, give out four methods in sharing knowle- dge in ord