基于现代契约理论的家族企业治理结构研究政治经济学专业论文.docxVIP

II II Abstract Family firms is the earliest forms of enterprises emerged in the development history of human society, which is also a widespread form of enterprise organization in todays world. It plays an important role in the economic development of countries in the world. More than 30 years of reforming and opening up, the private economy with family management as the mainstay is the most dynamic economic growth, which resolves as a populous developing country tens of millions of peoples employment problems, and occupies a very important position in our national economy. In the initial stage of development, family firms have unparalleled advantages compared with other forms of business organizations. Because of the use of personification governance system, it significantly reduces transaction costs as a result of using external factors ownership, then makes personification governance more efficient in the initial stage. But, with the family firms stage into the long-term and expanding the size of the business, it is bound to attract external physical capital and human capital, and the efficiency of the personification governance of the initial stage will continue to decrease. Traditional governance structure can no longer meet the needs of the further development of enterprises, so as to promote the family firm to change contractual mechanisms. This paper starts with this background and bases on the modern contract theory, with dynamic analyzing contract theory in the family firms as the main line, systematic analyzes the main issues of governance structure of the family firms, then provides some ideas for improving the governance structure of family firms. This paper starts with the growth path of family businesses, the evolution of governance structure, and the theoretical foundation of the family corporate governance, systematically analysis the contractual governance of family business at all stages. Through the analysis of the status and the main problems of