基于内部债视角的高管薪酬对商业银行风险承担的影响-资本市场专业论文.docxVIP

浙江工商大学硕士论文 浙江工商大学硕士论文 基于内部债视角的高管薪酬商业银行风险承担的影响 predicament，managers will pay close attention to the liquidation value of the company that will close to their own interest，and reduce the risk for this account．Therefore，inside debt can reduce the risk of commercial Banks．In addition，this article demonstrated that in considering of the sensitivity of management equity incentive and inside debt to risk—taking， banks can set the proportion of equity incentive and inside debt that will maximize the value of the value of banks after paying for the executive and at the same time banks may takes a smaller risk． This paper selected 1 6 listed banks as a sample，using panel data fixed effects model test the effect between the inside debt of executive compensation and the risk—taking behavior of the commercial banks， joined the board size，the proportion of independent directors，the size of board of supervisors，the proportion of the first largest shareholder,debt ratio，retum on equity,bank scale used to verify such variables as control variables．The empirical results show that there is significant negative correlation between inside debt and the risk of commercial bank．The results are verified in the process of derivation and empirical test． Joining the inside debt to executive pay Can reduce the risk of banks． Under this conclusion，this paper proposes some policy suggestions such as perfecting the salary system of commercial banks． KEYWORDS：executive compensation；inside debt；equity incentive； risk—taking 万方数据 浙江工商大学硕士论文 浙江工商大学硕士论文 基于内部债视角的高管薪酬对商业银行风险承担的影响 目录 摘要 I 』LBSTRACT ．III 第一章绪论 ．．2 第一节研究背景和意义 ．2 第二节研究方法和框架 ．3 一、研究方法 3 二、研究框架 4 三、创新与不足 ．． ． ．6 第二章文献综述 ．7 第一节传统薪酬激励与银行风险承担 ．7 第二节内部债务与银行风险承担 ．．9 第三节我国关于高管薪酬的研究现状 10 第四节简要评述 12 第三章理论模型 ． ．．13 第一节模型假设 13 第二节管理者的风险偏好 ．14 第三节薪酬结构——综合考虑股权激励、债权激励 18 第四章实证检验 30 第一节数据来源与变量选择 ．．30 一、数据来源 ．．30 二、变量的选取与定义 30 第二节样本描述性分析 32 第三节实证分析假设与结果 ．．33 一、面板数据的模型建立 ．33 二、研究假设 ．．34 三、实证结果与分析 ．．35 第五章结论与政策