财政学导论复旦大学课件.ppt

第四章 外部性;*;*;*;*;外部性造成的市场失灵;外部性造成的市场失灵;正的外部性;*;关于外部性的几个例子;公共地悲剧;外部性的市场对策;外部性的市场对策:科斯定理;《社会成本问题》;市场解决;科斯定理;*;外部性的公共对策;;Pigou税的问题;;*;正的外部性;*;*;火车开过，散发出的火星将沿途的农田毁坏。 Pigou thought it was desirable to force the railway to pay compensation. Coase thought the conclusion that it is desirable that the railway should be made liable for the damage it causes is wrong. The question at issue is not whether it is desirable to run an additional train or to install smoke-preventing devices; the question is whether it is desirable to have a system in which the railway has to compensate those who suffer damage from the fires which it causes or one in which the railway does not have to compensate them. ; 庇古指出两点： 1、首先政府需改变火车有权损害农田的 “自然状态” 2、火车应该给农民赔偿 科斯认为：1、The reason why compensation was not paid must have been that the railway had statutory authority to run steam engines. In the real world, Pigou’s example could only exist as a result of a deliberate choice of the legislature. It is not easy to imagine the construction of a railway in a state of nature. 2、火车一定要赔偿农民并没有依据，取决于火车和农民谁拥有铁路沿线土地的产权。If the railway could make a bargain with everyone having property adjoining the railway line and there were no costs involved in making such bargains, it would not matter whether the railway was liable for damage caused by fires or not. 少开火车（或安装防火星装置）还是少种农田，应该由社会成本和社会收益决定。;科斯Vs.庇古;考虑收入分配;*;公共对此：排污费 （这部分内容见Rosen, 83-93);统一排污费是成本最低的安排;排污权：总量控制;总量控制与交易制度（Cap-and-Trade）;总量控制与排污费比较;总量控制与排污费比较：成本不确定时;总量控制与排污费比较：成本不确定时;对外部性的管制;激励型管制带来的改进;控制污染与收入分配