上市公司业绩风险管理方法及其优化研究——委托代理条件下基于股东视角的分析-金融学专业论文.docxVIP

Abst Abstract II II Abstract The separation of ownership rights from management rights in modern corporations has brought about the problem of corporate governance, In the principal-agent relationships between shareholders and managers, due to asymmetric information and responsibility, incentive incompatibility as well as incomplete contracts, the agents may maximize their own benefits by “adverse selection” and “moral hazard”, thus the interests of shareholders as well as the companies are damaged. Therefore, a well-designed managers performance evaluation and incentive system is of great significance for the maximization of enterprises’ value and shareholders’ wealth. This is the main work in the performance risk management. When the shareholders want to manage the risk of performance fluctuation. They have the direct and indirect method to do this job, the indirect method involves establishing the compensation system and the bonus bank to inspire the manager work harder to meet the expected level of performance in the shareholders, which place a good condition on achieving the good performance, rather than guarantee the ultimate actual level of performance. And the second, the direct method managing the ultimate actual level of performance involve using a financial tool to insure or hedge the actual level, so this paper analyze the sensitivity of pay-to-performance and bonus bank in the constructing a compensation system based on the EVA evaluation approach in the content of indirect method, and then initiate a newly constructed financial tool to manage the risk of performance in the content of direct method. First, this paper introduces the traditional outcome of the sensitivity of pay-to-performance in the classic principal-agent model and some controversial empirical research outcome opposing to the outcome of the classic model. Then this article places the facts that there are real options in the modern company management, so this paper make a new