全球化和公司内部提供的激励措施：对外竞争的影响【外文翻译】.pdfVIP

原文： Globalization and the Provision of Incentives inside the Firm: The Effect of Foreign Competition Vicente Cun˜ at, London School of Economics Maria Guadalupe, Columbia University and CEPR This article studies the effect of changes in foreign competition on the structure of compensation and incentives of U.S. executives. We find that import penetration (instrumented with exchange rates and tariffs) leads to more incentive provision in a variety of ways. First, it increases the sensitivity of pay to performance. Second, it increases within-firm pay differentials between executive levels, with CEOs typically experiencing the largest wage increases. Finally, higher foreign competition is also associated with a higher demand for talent. These results suggest that increased foreign competition can explain some of the recent trends in compensation structures. I. Introduction The structure of wages and compensation in the United States changed substantially during the 1980s and 1990s: earnings inequality and returns to skill increased, with a particularly dramatic rise in pay at the top of the wage distribution (Katz and Autor 1999; Autor, Katz, and Kearney 2006). The executive labor market replicated the trends for workers in general, with inequality between executives and job mobility increasing, and CEO pay going updisproportionately (Frydman 2005). Simultaneously, firms increased their use of incentives and performance-related pay (such as piece rates, bonuses, and stock options) in the overall compensation of executives and workers (Murphy1999; Lemieux, MacLeod, and Parent 2009), significantly altering the structure of pay and the relative importance of fixed versus variable pay. This last fact has received much less attention, and there is limited knowledge of the causes behind the changes in incentive contracts and compensation structures inside firms.1 In this article, we show that a major force be