监测和控制银行风险对控制债务风险是否有利【外文翻译】.pdfVIP

外 文 翻 译 原文： Monitoring and Controlling Bank Risk: Does Risky Debt Help? ABSTRACT We examine whether mandating banks to issue subordinated debt would enhance market monitoring and control risk taking. To evaluate whether subordinated debt enhances risk monitoring, we extract the credit-spread curve for each banking firm in our sample and examine whether changes in credit spreads reflect changes in bank risk variables, after controlling for changes in market and liquidity variables. We do not find strong and consistent evidence that they do. To evaluate whether subordinated debt controls risk taking, we examine whether the first issue of subordinated debt changes the risk-taking behavior of a bank. We find that it does not. POLICYMAKERS ARE ACTIVELY CONSIDERING requiring banks to issue subordinated notes and debentures (SND). A mandatory SND requirement appears to be an important part of the market-oriented reforms, contained in the consultative paper issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1999). The U.S. Shadow Regulatory Committee has come out strongly in favor of mandatory SND as a mechanism for realizing enhanced market discipline of banks. More-over, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 mandated a joint Federal Reserve and U.S. Treasury study of bank SND requirements. This legislation also requires all large banking firms to have at least one issue of SND outstanding at all times. Proponents of mandatory SND regulation suggest that SND will enhance market discipline and curb excessive risk taking in two ways: through risk monitoring and through preventative influence. The benefits of risk monitoring are realized if investors accurately understand changes in a firms risk condition and incorporate their asse