康德论美的艺术作品的鉴赏依据.pdfVIP

论 文 摘 要 从康德美学中理出美的艺术的鉴赏依据的线索，可首先在审美主体中寻找这 种依据。由鉴赏而激起的愉悦感有其普遍性，愉悦感虽是主观情感，但当人们投 入到无利害的审美鉴赏之中时，便有理由期待其他人也有同样的感受，作出一致 的审美判断，进而在审美主体的情感中探寻理由。情感居于“知情意”之间作为 协调知性和理性的中介环节。当人们面对一物不去作认知判断，也不凭借善的概 念而感到愉悦时，事物的表象便直接与主体的情感相联结，由此获得的愉悦感是 心灵能力中的审美判断力自然作用的结果，这种情感也是人的心灵能力的自由体 现。自由心灵的能力即是美的艺术的鉴赏依据之一。 接着转向美的艺术，因为美的艺术的存在人们才能得以欣赏，才能作美的判 断。美的艺术由天才所创作，并区别于一般的事物。人们对一般事物是不会作审 美判断的，唯有对象是美的艺术时才会激起人们的审美的愉悦，由此才称得上是 在鉴赏美的艺术作品。天才将心中的美赋形于艺术中，美的艺术是由天才规范好 的。天才所创作的美的形象的禀赋得自自然的偶然馈赠。 最后审美主体于鉴赏中的自由心境与美的艺术的精神相遭遇而贯通了审美 主体与美的艺术。从而尝试着解决美的艺术的鉴赏依据的问题。 关键字：康德美学 艺术作品 鉴赏判断 ABSTRACT Ordering the clues of the basis of Taste in beautiful art from Kantian aesthetics, we could search it in aesthetic subject firstly. The pleasure which aroused by Taste has universality. Despite this pleasure is a subjective feeling, however, anyone who immerses themselves into uninterested pleasure of aesthetic taste has reasons to expect that others will have the same feeling, and make consistent aesthetic judgment, then search for reasons in the emotions of aesthetic subject. Affection which coordinates understanding and reason is an intermediary in the faculties of “cognition-affection-desire”. When people facing one thing and making no cognitive judgment, meanwhile feeling no satisfaction for following the concept of good, the appearances of things link with the affection of subject directly, thus achieving feeling of pleasure is a natural result of aesthetic judgment in mind. This kind of feeling is also a free expression of mind. And the faculty is one of the basis of taste on beautiful art. Then turning from aesthetic subject to beautiful art, because of the existence of beautiful art people can appreciate it and make beautiful judgment. The beautiful art is differe