畜禽疾病预防性投资与事后政府补偿的法和经济学分析.docVIP

通信地址：210095 南京农业大学经管学院05级博士生 王 瑜 联 系 人：王 瑜（025mail：2005206025@njau.edu.cn） 畜禽疾病预防性投资与事后政府补偿的法和经济学分析 王 瑜 应瑞瑶( （南京农业大学经济管理学院 南京 210095） 摘 要：本文从激励和质量安全两个视角阐明畜禽疾病预防性投资和事后政府补偿的关联性，并探讨了畜禽疾病预防性投资中事后补偿的必要性。在此基础上，通过构建一个多代理人的委托代理模型来证明预防性投资和事后政府补偿相匹配原则的可行性。研究结果表明，若事后政府补偿刺激了养殖户对预防性投资的追加，那么政府还应及时出台对养殖户对疫情“隐瞒不报”行为的奖惩措施，也就是说只有在一系列的激励措施下，事后政府补偿才会发挥最大作用和效果。 关键词：预防性投资；事后政府补偿；交易成本；道德风险 The Law Economics Analysis of Pre-event investment and Post-event Compensation of Livestock and Birds Diseases Wang Yu，Ying Ruiyao（College of Economics and Management， Nanjing Agricultural University， Nanjing， Jiangsu 210095） Abstract：study from two points of view firstly to investigate possible linkages between Pre-event preventive investments and the post event compensation package.It also reviews the economic dimensions of the compensation problem and derives the optimal compensation package that induces individual producers to both truthfully disclose information on livestock disease and increase preventive investments. Then，based on the institutionalization of government compensation，how to establish the long-term effective mechanism of “both prevention and compensation” to match the post-event compensation with farmers’ disease pre-event investment so as to encourage breeders’ prevention investment and enhance the quality control on the production of livestock and birds and reduce the risk and losses of breeders would be of actual significance. The result shows that the government should set up a series of regulations to make great incentives to breeders who would increase the Pre-event preventive investments and tell animal disease truthfully.This paper first argues that government post-event compensation is the prerequisite to increase breeders’ pre-event investment. Then，through constructing a multi-agent principal-agent model，this paper verifies the feasibility of matching principle of pre-event investment and post-event compensation and puts up with some countermeas