水权交易机制及博弈模型研究.pdfVIP

系统工程理论与实践 第 5 期 2∞7 年 5 月 文章编号: 1000-6788(2∞7 )05-0090-05 水权交易机制及博弈模型研究 李长杰1 ，王先甲1 ，莲文涛2 (1.武汉大学系统工程研究所，武汉 43∞72;2 中国科学院物理与数学研究所，武汉 43船71) 摘要: 针对水权交易市场最常见的买卖双方具有多人的双边交易形式，引人双边拍卖交易模式.首先 给出水权拍卖交易过程，建立了不完全信患下的水权交易双方叫价拍卖的贝岭斯博弈模型:设计了水权 交易双方同价拍卖的机制，给出拍卖规则和市场出清规则，绘出的机制满足有效性和激励相容性. 关键词: 水权交易;双边拍卖:贝øt斯溥弈模型;机制设计:激励相容 中图分类号: F724 .59 ; N94 文戴标志码: A Design of Mechanism and Bayesian Model of Water Rights Market LI ChaZIg-jiel ，暂A剖G Xian-jia ， FAr喝玩en-tao ( 1 . Systems Engineering Institute ,Wu主an University , W世主扭 43∞72 ， Cruna;2. Wuhan Institute of Physics and Mathematics ,The Chinese Academy of Scienc筒，Wuh四 43即71， China) Abstract: It is being a new direction of water ma凶gement in the world 10 establish tTad必le water rights mechanism 10 improve the efficient of the 国e and allocation of water recourses , which can achieve the optimízation allocation of water recourses. so water market and w配r rights have been wìdely dìscussed in recent years , in which the transac丘。ofiS modes and models of water rights arεthe core in water market study of 挂leory and practice. Based on the market norm of douhle auction , this paper describes the auction process of douhle 剧ction in water 岳芭hts m站前，血d es蚀hlishes the Bayesian model in íncomplete information of water rights douhle tradeoffs. A mechanísm design of wa主.er rights douhle auction is gi四n， including auction rule and mar如t clearing rule , and the effectivi可 and incentive compatihilit歹 ís proved. Lastly a model implementation is given. Keywo地: w配r rights transaction; douhle auction; haye血n model; 如恼ism des事; ince出ve compat始 1 引言 水资握作为一种重要的生产性