异地高考的博弈论分析选编.docxVIP

异地高考的博弈论分析王玉龙1，王波1（1.上海理工大学管理学院，上海 200093）摘要：教育部为了教育公平倡导各地实行异地高考，这一举措引发了北京、上海当地群体与随迁子女群体之间的激烈争论,本文建立了异地高考两大对立群体之间的静态博弈模型,解释了随迁子女群体希望在当地参加高考，而北京、上海本地群体坚决反对的原因。又通过建立教育部与北上广等地当地政府之间的动态博弈模型，指出教育部与当地政府之间的博弈是可以达到帕累托最优的，从而为学者们从定量的角度提出解决异地高考措施提供理论基础。另外本文还从教育部、当地政府、考生和家长这三个角度提出了解决异地高考问题，实现教育公平的政策建议。关键词：异地高考；博弈论模型；帕累托最优；理论基础中图分类号：F 224.32文献标识码：AThe Analysis ofCollege Entrance Examination in Other PlaceBased on Game Theory WANG Yu-long1,WANG Bo1(1. Business School, University of Shanghai for Science and Technology, Shanghai 200093, China)Abstract:The Ministry of Education advocated college entrance examination in other place around China for equitable education, which aroused a heated controversy between local residents and immigrant children in Beijing and Shanghai. This paper, from one side, builds a static game model between two opposing groups of college entrance examination in other place, explaining why immigrant children want to take college entrance examination in that place and why local residents of Beijing and Shanghai are against it strongly. From the other side, this paper builds a dynamic game model between the Ministry of Education and local governments of Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou, indicating that the game between the Ministry of Education and local governments can achieve Pareto Optimality state. Therefore, from a point of quantitative view, the scholars can put forward solutions of college entrance examination in other place based on the above theories. Moreover, this paper comes up with a solution from the perspective of the Ministry of Education, local government, students and parents, realizing the policy proposal of fairness education.Key Words: college entrance examination in other place; game model; Pareto Optimality; theoretical basis2003年，国务院针对随迁子女在城市接受义务教育的问题，提出了以流入地管理为主，以公办学校为主“两为主”的相关政策，允许随迁子女在流入地完成义务教育。十年后，当年接受义务教育的孩子要开始考高中、考大学了，“异地高考”这个问题就成为一个客观存在而且不能回避的现实问题。然而，随着山东、黑龙江等地异地高考政策的出台，人们对于北京、上海这些一线城市的异地高考政策的出台更加渴望。本文将运用博弈论的相关模型，对北京、上海一线城市的异地高考问