decentralized policy in resolving environmental disputes with private information分散的政策在解决环境纠纷与私人信息.pdfVIP

Theoretical Economics Letters, 2011, 1, 21-27 doi:10.4236/tel.2011.12006 Published Online August 2011 (/journal/tel) Decentralized Policy in Resolving Environmental Disputes with Private Information Huei-Chin Lin Department of Economics , National Dong Hwa University, Hualien, Taiwan, China E-mail : hclin@.tw Received July 3, 2011; revised August 1, 2011; accepted August 7, 2011 Abstract We have design a private-information game to incorporate independent experts’ assistance. With the better information provided by experts, the mistrust of the uninformed party might be dissolved. And we may get an effective and efficient resolution outcome. We will investigate conditions under which the experts’ infor- mation may help the economy to get an efficient outcome or an effective resolution result. Keywords: Conflict Resolution, Extensive-Form Game, Implementation, Strategic Information Transmission, Asymmetric Information 1. Introduction resource redistribution and local environmental issues, such as who is entitled to what rights, or who should get For the last few decades, environmental regulations have more. always been one of the major issues of government poli- Environmental disputes may even cause political in- cies and world collaborations. Countless conferences stability, depending on the scope and scale of the disputes, were held to solve the global warming (or climate change) and subsequently, causing economic problems. Dispute problem since the adoption of Kyoto Protocol in 1997. is inevitably i