上市公司高管显性激励治理效应研究——基于双向治理研究视角的经验证据.doc

上市公司高管显性激励治理效应研究 一一基于“双向治理”研究视角的经验 证据 方政徐向艺陆淑婧 山东大学管理科学与工程后流动站山东大学管 理学院 由于实际控制人的存在，中国上市公司的高管激励研究需要将实际控制人的影 响纳入高管激励研究屮。基于此，本文引入“双向治理”研究视角，期望通过考 察实际控制人在高管显性激励安排有效性中的影响，即高管迎合实际控制人需 耍的管理层权力，探索中国上市公司高管显性激励安排的治理效应。研宄发现， 货币化薪酬呈现积极的治理效应，但是高管持股却容易诱发代理问题，并且弱 化货币化薪酬的激励效果。进一步分析得知，高管期权激励的作用主要体现在货 币化薪酬与代理成本关系的调节效应屮，并丑主要见于民营企业和高科技行业。 本文研宂表明，中国情境下更为有效的高管显性激励组合应该是充分考虑实际 控制人的潸在影响，构建货币化薪酬与期权激励的有机结合，同时还需耍兼顾 高管持股的负面治理效应和期权激励的适用情境，进一步优化上市公司高管显 性激励的制度安排。 关键词： 高管显性激励;货币化薪酬;高管持股;期权激励;双向治理; 方政，山东大学管理科学与工程后流动站后、管理学, 研究方向为公司治理； :徐向艺，山东大学管理学院教授、生导师，研究方向为公司治理、 企业组织与战略管理； 陆淑婧，山东大学管理学院研究生，研究方向为公司治理 基金：W家自然科学基金面上项目 An Empirical Analysis on Executive Incentive抯 Effectiveness:A Perspective of 揟wo-way?Governance Fang Zheng Xu Xiangyi Lu Shujing Postdoctoral Station of Management Science and Engineering, Shandong University; School of Management, Shandong University; Abstract： In this paper，we make use of the panel data from 2009 to 2013 of Chinese A-share listed companies to explore the effectiveness of executives’ incentives by “two-way” governance perspective. In order to extend the theoretical border of executives incentive, this paper presents several contributions to current research:first, we analyze the systematic effects of different incentive arrangements, rather than one specific arrangement, such as compensation or ownership, which is the main stream of current studies;second, this paper focuses on the executives’ motivation upon different incentive arrangements and the relationship with shareholders， especially ultimate owners, which introduced the interactivity of shareholders and executives into traditional agent theory and corporate governance theory.Then, the paper offers a new theoretical perspective of managerial power theory, which means that managerial power should cater to ultimate owner’s demand;third, this paper demonstrates the effective arrangements of executives’ incentive, compensation as main basis and options as complements, which is testified with empirical anal