管理层权力、企业生命周期与投资效率——基于中国制造业上市公司的经验研究.docVIP

管理层权力、企业生命周期与投资效率 一一基于中国制造业上市公司的经验研 宄 谢佩洪汪春霞 上海对外经贸大学工商管理学院上海对外经贸大学 现有关于企业投资效率的研宄大多基于静态视角，并且较少区分过度投资和投 资不足样木。木文基于企业生命周期的动态视角研宄了我国制造业上市公司管理 层权力与投资效率的关系，选取我国沪、深两市2010-2015年A股制造业1770 家上市公司的5131个财务数据进行实证分析。结果表明：我国制造业上市公司投 资不足较为常见，但是过度投资的程度更为严重;过度投资随着企业生命周期呈 现先下降后上升的趋势，投资不足则呈现下降趋势;对于成长期企业，管理层权 力中的两职兼任、管理层持股和股权结构会显著加重过度投资;对于成熟期企业， 管理层权力中的管理层任职时间能够显著缓解过度投资问题，但两职兼任、管理 层任职时间和管理层持股会显著加重投资不足问题;对于衰退期企业，管理层权 力各变量没有显著作用。高管薪酬激励能够显著抑制成长期企业的过度投资，促 进成熟期企业的投资不足；另外，企业管理层任职时间能显著削弱成熟期高管薪 酬激励对投资不足的促进作用。 关键词： 管理层权力;投资效率;企业生命周期;高管薪酬激励;供给侧改革; 谢佩洪，上海对外经贸大学工商管理学院副教授、管理学，上海 市曙光学者，加拿大西安大略大学毅伟商学院高级访问学者，研宄方向为战略 管理与木土管理； 汪春霞，上海对外经贸大学研究生，研究方向为公司治理与企业 战略 基金：上海曙光学者计划项目(13SG53) Managerial Power, Corporation Lifecycle and Investment Efficiency:Empirical Research Based on Chinese Manufacturing Listed Companies Xie Peihong Wang Chunxia School of Management， Shanghai University of International Business and Economics; Abstract： The past research on stimulating economic growth is mainly based on the demand side. Recently ‘Reform of the Supply Side’ provides a new way to seek economic growth, the core of which is to improve the efficiency of fund utilization to promote the transformation and upgrading of enterprises. Therefore, how to ensure the investment efficiency of enterprises becomes the focus of attention. Most of the existing researches on enterprise investment efficiency are based on the static perspective, and they ignore the difference in the self-interest motivation of managers at different lifecycle stages. In addition, most researches pay less attention to distinguishing between overinvestment and underinvestment samples. As a result， this paper studies the relationship between executive power and investment efficiency in Chinese listed manufacturing companies based on the dynamic perspective of corporation lifecycle. In addition, this study analyzes the relationship between executive compensation incentive and inefficient investment at different stages, and the moderating effect between manage