高管抑制对公司创新绩效的影响.docVIP

高管“抑制”对公司创新绩效的影响 欧阳辰星游达明李龙潘攀 中南大学商学院中南大学本科生院国防科技大学 防科技与武器装备发展战略研宄中心 根据委托代理理论，高管“抑制”措施能够缓解高管“趋利避害”行为，从而 提升公司创新绩效。然而，来自中国A股的数据表明：对现阶段中国上市公司而 言，高管“抑制”措施尚未发挥应有效用。具体地，本文首先考察了高管“抑 制”对创新绩效的影响，研究发现，股权集中度越高、高管薪酬越高、独立董事 规模越大越不利于公司创新缋效的提升，而女性高管规模扩大能提高公司创新 绩效。另外，本文还考察了不同产权性质下，高管“抑制”对创新绩效的影响。 结果表明，与国有上市公司不同的是，非国有上市公司的独立董事规模对创新 绩效没有显著影响。 关键词： 高管抑制;创新绩效;委托代理理论;产权性质; 欧阳辰星（1981-）,女，湖南长沙人，屮南大学商学院研究生, 本科生院讲师，研宄方向：创新管理，知识管理； 作达明（1963-）,男，湖南益阳人，中南大学商学院教授，博 导师，研宄方向：生态经济，创新管理； 作者（1980-）,男，湖北武汉人，国防科技大学国防科技与武器装 备发展战略研宂中心助理研宂员，研宂方向：国防科技发展战略； 作者简1988-），男，四川达州人，中南大学商学院生，研 宄方向：资本市场，金融工程。 2016-10-09 基金：国家自然科学基金面上项目The Influence of Executive Restraint Measures on Corporate Innovation Performance OUYANG Chen-xing YOU Da-ming LI Long PAN Pan Business School， Central South University; Center for Defense Science and Technology Strategy, National University of Defense Technology; Abstract： Based on the principal-agent theory, the executive restraint measures can relieve the managers’ behavior tending toward benefit, and improve innovation performance. However, China’s A-share market data show that the executive restraint measures have not yet played an effective role in the current stage of China’s listed companies. Primarily, this paper examines the executive restraint measures’ effect on innovation performance. The results show that the concentration ratio of shares, the executive compensation, and the scale of independent directors are not conducive to enhance the company’s innovation performance. However the ratio of female executives is favourable to improve the innovation performance of the company. In addition, this paper also examines the impact of executive restraint measures on innovation performance from the perspective of property rights. We find that, different from state-owned enterprises, the scale of independent directors has no significant effect on innovation performance in non-state enterprises. Keyword： Executive Restraint Measures; Innovation Performance; Principal-agen