WorkLife Incentive Schemes工作与生活的激励的方案.pptVIP

Work-Life Incentive Schemes Models in this area look at the whole working career of an individual and try to make pay over the career keep the individual productive. * Remember workers have an incentive to shirk when the gain from doing so is greater than the cost. If G = gain from shirking, θ = probability of losing job if caught shirking w = wage in current job w* = wage in next best job N = number of years the worker might expect to continue working for the firm, Then shirk if G θ(w – w*)N. The term to the right of the inequality represents the cost of shirking. Here I will focus on the term (w – w*) and making this as large as possible because then the individual probably would not want to shirk. Years on Job – Job Tenure $ In this section we are going to use a graph like this one. A common name for a graph like this is an “earnings profile.” Here the profile would show the earnings each year at the number of years on the job. Statistical studies usually show data that is increasing as you move from left to right. Years on Job – Job Tenure $ Recall from our analysis of labor demand that workers get paid a wage = VMP in a competitive labor market. The curve shown suggests that although there is increasing value to the firm from workers having more experience, the value has diminishing returns (and even declines). VMP Years on Job – Job Tenure $ Here I have added a line w* and this line indicates the workers opportunity cost of remaining with the firm. When the worker is younger the w* line represents wages outside the firm and when the worker is older the line represents utility from leisure, nonlabor income and saving, pensions and social security. VMP w* T2 T1 Now, if the wage the worker gets, w, is equal to the VMP, then VMPw* over much of the worker tenure. The difference is greatest at T1 and the difference shrinks after that and even becomes negative after T2. Since part of the cost of shirking is w – w*, we see after time T1 the cost of shirking