股权结构与CEO报酬关系的实证研究-技术经济及管理专业论文.docxVIP

II II ABSTRACT The CEO compensation has come under more and more consideration in academia and industry. The construction of rational manager compensation system is a core content of efficient governance, and many academicians start to carry on the empirical analysis to corporate mangers’ compensation. In order to investigate the effectiveness of listed corporate’ ownership structure to compensation, my paper constructs the CEO reward influence the structural model under the property right theory, the transaction cost theory, the principal-agent theory, the management science and other discipline knowledge. Base on data from annual report of companies listed in Shenzhen and Shanghai in2006 and 2007, this paper analyses effectiveness among enterprises’ features, stockholding structure and CEO compensation. This article used variable like growth potential (the net profit rate of increment), the stockholders rights concentration degree (CR3, CR5, and H5), and the stockholders rights controlled the system (CR1, Z), the first major stockholders nature and so on. In addition, it involves controlled variables and so on company achievements, scale, CEO age and tenure in office, and study various factors to compensation influence through multi-dimensional stepwise regression model. Because our country Major industry and the small-sized enterprises stockholders rights structure difference is in evidence, the explanation to the interrelated factors the exist objection. This article studies the influence, relating to both stockholders’ rights structure separately to the CEO compensation, with two groups of data. They can accurately explain the relations of the variables and CEO compensation. In the model, the research discovered that, The MP reward of CEO from the major industries is higher than small and medium-sized enterprises, while the total compensation is lower. The huge scale does not reduce the efficiency of companies’ performance; the state-owned stock proportion redu