九江正德股份有限公司股权激励分析-工商管理专业论文.docxVIP

II II Abstract The separation of the modern corporate ownership and control causes agency costs. Although the equity incentive has widely implemented in many enterprises at home and abroad as a long-term incentives to reduce the agency costs, however, the opinion about the equity incentive effect has not reached a consensus. Especially in non-listed companies, the non-marketable stock lead to more particularity of its stock options study. Based on this, the paper uses the case study method and take Jiangxi JiuJiang ZhengDe Co., Ltd. for example to explore the virtual stock option plan for non-listed companies. The paper firstly describes the background of implementing equity incentive in JiuJiang ZhengDe Co., Ltd. Then, the company decides to implement a virtual stock option plan. The author introduces the virtual stock option plan in JiuJiang ZhengDe and measures the equity incentive effect in three aspects which are company performance, human capital and industry competitiveness. Study suggests that the company stock option plan has not achieved the desired results. Next, for the fact of ineffective incentive introduced in the previous chapter, the paper studies the equity incentive plan of the company in the opinion of contract elements and governance environment. About the contract elements, the author found there exist the short term of option period, the ESO are not granted to the right persons and the persons also do not have the reasonable quantity, the extraction of incentive fund is very casual, the prices involved in the stock option are not reasonable. In addition to these, the stock option don not set the exercise conditions. All these factors make stock options become a tool for managers to increase their benefits. About the corporate governance, it found the corporate exists high ownership concentration in which the largest shareholder makes every decision. The board of directors and supervisors are not set rationally