大股东掏空对企业投资效率影响的实证研究.docVIP

PAGE PAGE 38 大股东掏空对企业投资效率影响的实证研究 摘要：大股东掏空是我国公司治理层面研究的核心领域之一，但该领域对于其具体的行为后果和对企业投资效率的影响作用的研究，仍具有一些缺陷。本文将掏空和企业投资效率结合起来，首次引入资金占用作为中介变量，第一大股东持股比例和独董规模作为调节变量，利用CSMAR数据库2008-2013年A股上市公司的全样本，通过Stata 12.0软件进行面板数据分析。实证研究发现，大股东掏空行为与企业投资效率之间存在负相关关系，大股东的掏空程度越高，企业的投资效率越低；并且在这其中资金占用起部分中介效应，具体表现为：掏空程度的增加，会促使大股东通过增加资金占用来降低企业投资效率；除此之外，研究还证明了，第一大股东持股比例和独董规模对其影响机制，分别具有显著的负向调节作用，当第一大股东持股比例增加时，大股东掏空对企业投资效率的消极影响会减小；独董规模的增加，也会减小大股东掏空对企业投资效率的消极影响。这为已有的公司治理研究提供了新的研究视角，也为我国上市公司以及政府部门对治理大股东掏空、保护中小股东利益提供了理论参考和经验证据。 关键词：企业投资效率，掏空，资金占用，公司治理 An empirical study on how does the large shareholders’ Tuning influence the enterprise investment efficiency Abstract: The tunneling of large shareholders is one of the core areas of the corporate governance in China, but the research on its specific behavior consequence and influence on the efficiency of investment still has some defects. In this paper, I combined the tunneling and corporate investment efficiency, firstly，introducing the occupation of capital as a mediating variable, the proportion of the first shareholder and director scale as adjustment variables, using 2008-2013 A shares of listing Corporation from CSMAR database as the sample, analyzing panel data by using Stata 12 software. This empirical study finds that, there is a negative correlation between major shareholders tunneling behavior and corporate investment efficiency; and in which the fund plays a partial mediating effect, the specific performance is: the increase of the extent of major shareholders’ tunneling will lead to the increase of funds，and account for to reduce investment efficiency. In addition, the research also prove that the mechanism of the effect of the proportion of the first shareholder and director of its scale, which has a significant negative effect, when the proportion of the first shareholder increases, the negative influence of tunneling of major shareholders on corporate investment efficiency will decrease; increase the scale of the independent director, nega