生育率悖论：教育是破解之道.pptxVIP

Thefertilityrateparadox:

Educationiskey

10September2025

Content

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ExecutiveSummary

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Moneycan’tbuymorechildren

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Lowfertilityratesareheretostay

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Theworldpopulationmightpeakearlierandageevenfasterthanexpected

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Capital-fundedpensionprovisionandflexibleretirementsolutionsgainin

importance

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Educationiskeyforincreasingproductivity

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Appendix

AllianzResearch

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Moneycan’tbuymorechildren.AmongOECDcountries,taxbreaks,cash

benefitsandservicesgrantedforfamiliesandchildrencorrespondedto1.8%

ofGDP.IntheEU-27,theaverageshareofgovernmentexpendituresspendon

familyandchildrenhasincreasedfrom1.6%in2001to1.9%ofGDPin2023,

rangingfrom0.8%inMaltato4.0%inDenmark.However,inmanyindustrializedcountriestodayfamilyandchildrenpolicyisnotonlyconsideredanimportant

elementinpreventingchildhoodpovertyandsmoothingconsumption,butalsoasmoreorlesssubtleincentivetoincreasethefertilityrate.Theunprecedenteddeclineinfertilityratesinmanycountries,callsthetargetsoftoday’sfamily

policyintoquestion,suggestingthatjustspendingmoremoneydoesnot

necessarilyleadtohigherfertilityrates.Thisinturnraisesthequestionof

whetheritwouldnotbemoreimportanttofocusfamilypoliciesonguaranteeingthateverychildhasthesamechancesirrespectiveoftheparents’incomeandtopushaheadwiththenecessarymeasurestoadaptlabormarketsandpension

systemstotherealityofagingsocieties.Evenmoreso,iftoday’scriticsoftheUNpopulationprojectionsturnouttoberightandtheworldpopulationagesmuchstrongerthanexpectedinthelongterm.

Fertilityrateskeepdeclining,anditishardtotellwhy.Theunprecedenteddeclineinfertilityratesisaglobalphenomenon.InGermany,forexample

ithasfallentoanaverage1.35childrenperwoman,inJapanitdroppedto

1.15childrenandtheUSreportedarecordlow1.6childr