高级公司理财3.pptVIP

Why do companies go public?(Pagano, Panetta Zingale, JF, 1998) Purpose Analyze ex-ante characteristics of IPO decisions Analyze ex-post consequences of IPO decisions Data 11 years: 1982-1992 Compares firms eligible to go public vs firms went public 139 new listings on the Milan Stock Exchange Eliminated: bank, insurance, financial companies Final sample: 69 firms of which 29 are curve-outs Some empirical predictions(See: Table II) Information asymmetry hypothesis The probability of going public should be positively related with age, size of a firm Financing constraint hypothesis The probability of going public should be positively related with firm’s investments, leverage and growth Diversification hypothesis The probability of going public should be positively related with the riskiness of a firm Empirical Results Determinants of IPO decision: Table III Effects of the IPO decision: Table IV Ownership and Operating performance of IPO firms(Mikkelson, Partch Shah: JFE 1997) Going public represents a decline in the (owner)manager’s stakes in the firm. Agency theory predicts that there will be less alignment of shareholders interest with that of the managers. As such, firm performance will decline after IPO. Empirical results Managerial ownership declines substantially after IPO. Yet sizeable ownership stake remains. A significant decline in operating performance only in the first year of IPO, but not later on. Operating performance is unrelated to managerial ownership. Prediction of agency theory does not hold! Managers continue to remain large shareholders Other mechanisms (incentive compensation, takeover threat, etc.) play a more important role after IPO than ownership stakes. Capital Structure How should a company choose its debt -equity mix that makes its total market value as large as possible? Do capital structure changes matter? Why they matter? Are capital structure decisions relevant? Under the assumption of perfect capital market, capital structu