我国上市公司经理股票期权激励研究.pdfVIP

要 经理股票期权起源于20 世纪50 年代的美国，是一种旨在解决企业 委托-代理” 矛盾、报酬和风险相对称的长期激励制度。经理股票期权激励有助于协调公司所 有者与经营者之间的利益冲突、降低、委托代理成 、低成本吸引和稳定人才及 解决经理人的退休问题。因此，20 世纪80 年代以来，以美国为首的大量公司纷纷 采用股票期权作为对高级管理人员的报酬激励，股票期权收益在高管薪酬中所占 比重越来越高，股票期权也在相当长的时间里被认为是长期激励高管行之有效的 手段。但股票期权的负面效应在于：经理人获得的巨额利润可能并非其能力体现， 股价暴跌可能会使股票期权的激励机制失去作用,可能诱发经理人操纵公司股价的 道德风险问题，可能产生股利分配风险等。20 世纪90 年代后期以来，我国出台了 鼓励实施和规范股票期权激励的相关法规，上市公司己经开始进行股票期权激励 制度的探索，并制定了一系列股票期权激励的制度和办法。论文首先介绍了经理 股票期权激励的内涵及理论依据，并对经理股票期权激励的效应进行了剖析；接 着在分析国内外经理股票期权激励发展状况的基础上，指出我国股票期权激励在 实施中存在实施技术设计、收入分配差距的扩大、资本市场的不完善和公司治理 机制的不完善等诸多难点；然后对我国伊利股份和宝山钢铁股权激励计划的案例 进行了评价及对比分析，探讨经理股票期权激励设计方案；最后在改进我国上市 公司股票期权激励的技术设计和完善股票期权激励的实施环境等方面提出相关建 议。 关键词：经理股票期权 上市公司 激励 1 Abstract Executive stock option (ESO), which originated in the 1950s, the United States, is a long-term incentive system aimed at resolving the principal-agent problem. ESO can coordinate the interest conflicts between shareholders and executives, reduce agency costs, attract and stabilize the talents with low costs, and help to solve the problem of executives’ retirements. Therefore, since the 1980s, a large number of companies led by the United States began to use ESO as a compensation incentive of executives. The ratio of ESO in the executive compensation is higher and higher, and for a long period of time, ESO is considered to be a effective means of long-term incentive. But ESO has some negative effects as follows: The profits of executives may not be reflected in the abilities of executives, the incentive effect of ESO may lose when the stock price falls, ESO may induce the moral hazard of executives such as manipulate the companys stock price and have a risk of dividend distribution. Since the late 1990s, some laws and regulations about ESO were introduced in China, and listed companies bega