可错论的合理证明与碰巧为真的运气.docVIP

可错论的合理证明与碰巧为真的运气 　　[摘要] 　　葛梯尔问题是如何解决知识论上存在的悖论的问题，并非仅仅是寻找第四条件的问题；葛梯尔问题的实质在于可错论的合理证明与运气的结合，而非仅仅是推理的前提有误，更非语词的误用。可错论的合理证明始终会为信念之碰巧为真保留一定的可能性，运气使这种可能性成为现实；可错论的合理证明原则不可废，否则，怀疑论将不可避免，因此，消除运气的影响就成了解决葛梯尔问题的关键。 　　[关键词] 可错论； 合理证明； 运气； 葛梯尔问题； 敏感性； 安全性； 知识论 　　Fallibilist Justification and Veritic Epistemic Luck： The Essence 　　of Gettier Problem and Misunderstandings in It 　　Wen Xueping 　　（School of Marxism， Southwest University of Political Science Law， Chongqing 401120， China） 　　Abstract： 　　More than half a century ago， the American philosopher Edmund Gettier proposed two classic counterexamples against the traditional tripartite analysis of knowledge. These counterexamples have brought a great problem for the definition of knowledge， which is called ″the Gettier problem.″ There has been endless debate among epistemologists about how to understand and solve it and a lot of misunderstandings of that problem have thus arisen. 　　Firstly， the Gettier problem has been narrowly interpreted by some epistemologists as the problem of searching for a fourth condition that has to add to the justifiedtruebelief definition of propositional knowledge. In fact， the the Gettier problem aims to solve the paradox in epistemology which can be shown in the following three propositions： （1） Knowledge is justified true belief； （2） S has a justified true belief p； （3） S does not know that p. These three propositions can not be true at the same time because they are inconsistent. To solve this paradox， you can partly or completely deny any one or two of those three propositions. Searching for the fourth condition is but one of the many proposed approaches to the Gettier problem. 　　Secondly， some epistemologists think that the Gettier problem results from the false premise of deduction， which directly leads to the nofalse premise solution （NFPS） to the problem. NFPS can either be strict or moderate. As a strong advocate of strict NFPS， the Chinese epistemologist Chen Jiaming interprets epi