基于经济增加值的经营者激励报酬计划探析.docVIP

基于经济增加值的经营者激励报酬计划探析 摘 要  随着近几年现代企业制度的逐步建立,公司治理结构的优化以及股东和经营者的委托 —代理问题凸现，已成为经济学界亟待解决的一大重要问题。减少股东与经营者之间的利益冲突,对经营者实施一定的、有效的监督和激励将成为优化治理结构和降低委托—代理成本的有效途径。经济增加值是一种业绩衡量以及经营者激励的指标,弥补了传统业绩评价指标的缺陷。基于EVA的经营者薪酬激励机制能够克服传统评价指标的局限性，将经营者的利益与股东利益联系起来，努力为股东创造更多的财富量,降低委托代理成本,缓解股东和经营者间的利益冲突。 本文将以定性和定量分析方法，在理论分析基础之上，并运用适当的图形以及假设的例子来辅助解释说明。论文内容首先会解释基于EVA的经营者激励报酬计划的基础理论的概念和相关的理论概念含义，然后结合我国传统经营者激励报酬计划的分析，来引入基于EVA的经营者激励报酬体系方式；进而探讨基于EVA的经营者激励报酬计划的设计，其中包括基本原则、应该考虑的因素、奖金计划设计、虚拟股票期权设计。在奖金计划设计中，根据企业不同的发展阶段设计与之相适应的激励计算方式。最后以案例分析来论述基于EVA的经营者报酬激励机制在我国的运用，并提出实施基于EVA的经营者报酬激励机制在我国运用中应注意的对策建议。关键词：经济增加值 经营者 报酬激励   THE RESEARCH ON EXECUTIVES’INCENTIVE PAY SCHEMES BASED-ON EVA ABSTRACT As in recent years gradually establish a modern enterprise system, the optimization of corporate governance structure as well as the shareholders and managers entrusted agency - highlights, economic circles has become an important problem to be solved. Reduce conflicts of interest between shareholders and operators, the operators to implement certain and effective supervision and incentive will be optimized governance structure and reduce the principal - agent cost effective way. Economic value added is an indicator of performance measure and the managers motivation, makes up the defect of the traditional performance evaluation index. Operators pay incentive mechanism based on EVA can overcome the limitations of traditional evaluation index and the interests of managers and shareholders interests, efforts to create more wealth for shareholders, reduce principal-agent cost, reduce the conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers.  This paper will with qualitative and quantitative analysis method, based on the theoretical analysis, and using the appropriate graphics and hypothe