基于伯川德模型的发电企业价格博弈分析.pdfVIP

第34卷第4期 华北 电力大学学报 Vo1．34．No．4 2007年7月 Journal of North China Electric Power University Ju1．，2007 基于伯川德模型的发电企业价格博弈分析 程 成 ，李桂锋 ，何永贵 (1，华北电力大学工商管理学院，河北保定071003；2．邢台广播电视大学，河北邢台054000) 摘要：随着我国电力工业从集中管理垄断经营模式向电力市场开放模式的根本转变，电力市场中过度的价格 竞争开始显现。运用博弈论的方法，通过伯川德模型分析发电企业间的价格博弈和市场竞争，指出发电企业 实施产品差异化、构筑企业核心竞争力、合理规划行业企业数量是解决我国电力市场不舍理竞争的有效方 法。 关键词：发电企业；价格竞争；博弈论；伯川德模型 中图分类号：TM73 文献标识码：A 文章编号：1007—2691(2007)04—0073—03 Analysis of game theory on the price of power plants based on Bertrand model CHENG Cheng ，LI Gui—fen ，HE Yong-gui (1．School of Business and Administration，North China Electric Power University，Baoding 071003，China； 2．Radio and Television University of Xingtai，Xingtai 054000，China) Abstract：At present，power industry is shifting from centralized management，monopoly business model to an open electricity market model in China．Excessive price competition has already started to become apparent．This paper ex— plores the power of market competition among enterprises through Bertrand mode1．Using game theory and Bertrand model，this paper analyzes the price of power plants gam e and market competition．Finally，this paper presents an ef— fective method to solve the electricity market irrational competition，which is the implementation of enterprises to dif— ferentiate their products．builds a core competitiveness of enterprises and plans a reasonable number of power indus— tries． Key words：power plants；price competition；gam e theory；Bertrand Model 的业务或环节，其进入壁垒和退出壁垒已经被逐 0 引 言 渐克服，某些环节的自然垄断性不再成立，各国 开始纷纷放松电力行业准入管制，从而为引入竞 电力工业市场化改革的核心在于打破垄断， 争创造了条件l