不动产抵押贷款的博弈分析与机制设计.pdfVIP

预 测 V01．28，No．6 FORECASTING 2009年第6期 不动产抵押贷款的博弈分析与机制设计 姜丽宁。崔文田 (西安交通大学管理学院，陕西西安710049) 摘 要：本文应用完全信息静态博弈模型，对不动产抵押贷款中借款人、评估机构和银行之间的博弈行为进行分 析，而且分别讨论了现行两种惩罚策略对降低银行坏账风险的有效性。研究结果表明存在一种激励的悖论：加 重对评估机构高估处罚，长期中能减少借款人欺诈概率，降低银行抵押贷款的风险；而加重对借款人欺诈处罚， 长期中却能增加评估机构高估的概率。为此，本文设计了评估担保机制，该机制满足激励相容条件，能有效地降 低银行的贷款风险。 关键词：不动产抵押贷款；评估；博彝；机制设计 中图分类号：F224．32 文献标识码：A 文章编号：1003—5192(2009)06—0043—05 Game andMechanisminRealEstate Loan Analysis Design Mortgage JIANG Wen—tian Li—ning，CUI 710049，China) (SchoolofManagement，Xi’anJmowngUniversity，Xi’an the behaviorsofthe institutionandthebankinrealestate Abstract：Thispaperanalyzesgame borrower，theappraisal loanwiththe informationstatic model．In discusseswhichofthebothcurrent mortgage complete game addition，thepaper the thatthere’sanincentive fine measuresismoreeffectivetoreducehank’srisks．Theresultsshow fining paradox：to the institution’s willreducethe ofborrower’scheatinthe term，which appraisal overvaluation—appraisalprobability long fine willincreasethe institution’sovervaluation— calldecreasethebank’s theborrower’scheat mortgagerisks；to appraisal withthis mechanismis inthis inthe run．Inordertodeal article， appraisallong paradox．anappraisal—warrant designed