黄新飞 《微观经济学》寡头补充知识.pptVIP

Models Cournot competition (quantity, simultaneous) Bertrand competition (price, simultaneous) Stackelberg competition (quantity, sequential) Price leadership competition (price, sequential) Collusion (quantity, collusive) Cournot Competition Firm 1: max y1 p1 = p(y1+y2)y1 – c1(y1) Firm 2: max y2 p2 = p(y1+y2)y2 – c2(y2) FOC p(y1+y2) + (?p/?y1)y1 = MC1(y1) p(y1+y2) + (?p/?y2)y2 = MC2(y2) Example Solve the Cournot equilibrium for p(y) = a – by, c1(y1) = c2(y2) = 0 Stackelberg Competition Leader: firm 1 Follower: firm 2 Approach: Backward solution The Follower’s Problem max y2 p2 = p(y1+y2) y2 – c2(y2) get reaction function of firm 2: y2 = f2(y1). FOC: p(y1+y2) +(?p/?y2)y2 = MC2(y2) The Leader’s Problem max y1 p1 = p(y1+f2(y1)) y1 – c1(y1) get optimal output of firm 1 and then Stackelberg equilibrium: y1*, y2* = f2(y1*) FOC: p(y1+y2) +(?p/?y1)y1 +(?p/?f2) (df2/dy1)y1 = MC1(y1) Example Solve the Stackelberg equilibrium for p(y) = a – by, c1(y1) = c2(y2) = 0 Betrand Competition Firm 1: max p1 p2 = p1 y1(p1, p2) – c1(y1) Firm 2: max p2 p2 = p2 y2(p1, p2) – c2(y2) Firm 1’s Problem y1(p1, p2) = D(p1) if p1 p2, y1(p1, p2) = 0 if p1 p2, Thus firm 1 prefers to set p1 = p2 – e, where e 0 and →0. Firm 2’s Problem Similarly firm 2 prefers to set p2 = p1 – e It turns out that both firms reduce price continuously until one or both of them get zero profit. Example Solve the Betrand equilibrium for p(y) = a – by, c1(y1) = c2(y2) = 0 Price Leadership Competition Leader: firm 1 Follower: firm 2 Approach: Backward solution The Follower’s Problem max p2 p2 = p2 y2(p1, p2) – c2(y2) Optimal choice: p2 = p1 – e where e 0 and →0. Roughly, denote p2 = p1 The Follower’s Problem max p2 p2 = p2 y2(p1, p2) – c2(y2) Optimal choice: p2 = p1 – e where e 0 and →0. Roughly, denote p2 = p1 Follower’s problem becomes to max y2 p2 = p1y2 – c2(y2) FOC: p1 = MC2(y2), gives y2(p1). The Leader’s Problem Res