家族企业的高管激励与研发投入关系研究——基于家族所有权和控制权视角.doc

家族企业的高管激励与研发投入关系研 究一一基于家族所有权和控制权视角 安电子科技大学经济与管理学院 以2010—2013年披露有研发投入且数据完整的1171家家族上市公司为样本，实 证检验了家族所有权和控制权对高管激励与研发投入关系的调节作用。结果表明: (1)家族所有权是高管股权激励与研发投入关系的半调节变量，正向调节高管 股权激励与研发投入的关系。家族所有权对高管薪酬激励与研发投入关系不具有 调节作用。(2)家族控制权是高管股权激励与研发投入关系的同质调节变量。 具体表现为:在高控制权的家族企业屮，高管股权激励与研发投入负相关;而在 低控制权的家族企业中，高管股权激励与研发投入正相关。家族控制权是高管薪 酬激励与研发投入关系的半调节变量，负向调节高管薪酬激励与研发投入的关 关键词： 家族所有权;家族控制权;高管激励;研发投入; 王燕妮，E-mail:ynwang@xidian. ; 周琳琳，E-mail: 1121479761@。 基金：国家自然科学基金项目“RD资木化与费用化政策选择的中间效应研究” Study on the Relationship Between Executive Incentive and RD Investments of Family Firms: Based on the Family Ownership and Control Perspective Wang Yanni Zhou Linlin School of Economics and Management of Xidian University; Abstract： Taking 1171 listed family companies that revealed RD investments and complete data during 2010 and 2013 as samples, this paper uses two moderators, family ownership and family control, to empirically test their moderation of the correlation between executive incentive and RD investments. The results show that: (1) Family ownership is the half moderator of the relationship between executive equity incentive and RD investments， positively moderating their correlation, while family ownership docs not moderate the relationship between executive compensation incentive and RD investments; (2) Family control is the homogeneous moderator of the relationship between executive equity incentive and RD investments. In high control family firms, executive equity incentive is negatively related to RD investments, while in low control family firms, executive equity incentive is positively related to RD investments. Family control is the half moderator of the relationship between executive compensation incentive and RD investments， negatively moderating their correlation. Keyword： Family Ownership; Family Control; Executive Incentive; RJD Investment; 一、引言 现代企业的发展离不开研究与开发支出(RD)，RD是企业成长的源泉和内动 力。所有权和经营权的分离造成了职业经理与股东之间利益的潜在冲突(Jensen and Meckling, 1976),导致经理人员在研发投入上进行机会主义投资。与公众 投资者相比，家族投资者会更关注企业