基于代理理论的上市公司投融资关系分析——国有 民营上市公司的比较-analysis of the relationship between investment and financing of listed companies based on agency theory - comparison of state-owned private listed companies.docxVIP

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基于代理理论的上市公司投融资关系分析——国有 民营上市公司的比较-analysis of the relationship between investment and financing of listed companies based on agency theory - comparison of state-owned private listed companies.docx

基于代理理论的上市公司投融资关系分析——国有 民营上市公司的比较-analysis of the relationship between investment and financing of listed companies based on agency theory - comparison of state-owned private listed companies

Abstractdebt financing and over-investment restrained.To test the relationship between investment and financing in listed companies, the descriptive and empirical analyses have been made with the state-owned listed and private listed companies as the data samples. Facts of 611 Listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen are selected, models of GLS and OLS have been used to do the regression test and stability test. In conducting empirical analysis, the company’s growth and risk transfer motivation are the two major points to start. A certain conclusion have been achieved as following: for the integrity of the sample company, when the company’s risk transfer motivation is less than zero, the investment rate of the sample company reaches its maximum in 20-40% liability interval, after which diminishing by year. When the company’s risk transfer motivation is greater than zero, the investment rate of the sample company diminishes with the debt-level increasing year by year. This shows that our investment in listed companies is dominated by under-investment effect. The statistical analysis tells from the samples of each group that whether by overall samples or by the nature of property rights, it’s the same result that the investment rate is much lower to the companies of below-zero risk transfer motives than the companies of above-zero risk transfer motives. It proves different motive causes great influence to the relationship between financing and investment. When the motive is less-zero degree, the investment size will be reduced, while greater-zero degree, size increased. In the higher growth state-owned listed companies, the company’s motivation above or below zero, debt financing coefficient shows no significant negative correlation, so debt financing plays no governing role for over-investment, in other words, the negative correlation is weak in financing and investment spending scale. To private listed companies, whether the risk transfer motive is above or below z

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