从基础主义到实用主义——论罗蒂对认识论哲学的批判.docVIP

从基础主义到实用主义—论罗蒂对认识论哲学的批判 中文摘要 中文摘要 罗蒂认为自古希腊以来的整个传统哲学都是一种基础主义的哲学。它的基本 特征是认识性的。它认为文化的任何部分只有参照这个基础才能得到真正的理解， 我们只有参照这个基础才能理解我们的文化。罗蒂反对这种理解，通过塞拉斯和 奎因，他引入了一种关于知识的整体主义的和实用主义的理解。按照这种理解， 哲学的功能不是认识，而是教化。教化的目的是维持谈话进行下去，而不是发现 客观真理。为此，我们需要与生活于不同文化、不同历史时代的人进行对话。由 此，我们不断地重新描述世界、重新创造我们自己，使我们成为更好、更有趣和 更有效的人。 本文分为导言与三章共四部分。第一部分为导言，整体俯瞰了罗蒂从基础注 意到实用主义的跨越。第一章考察了罗蒂对近代哲学的批判。第二章考察了罗蒂 借以批判传统哲学的两个手段：塞拉斯对被给予的批判和奎因对分析性的批判。 第三章论述了罗蒂的实用主义理论。 关键词：心的发明 认识论行为主义 教化 种族中心主义 作 者：刘晓伟 指导教师：郭世平 英文摘要 从基础主义到实用主义—论罗蒂对认识论哲学的批判 From foundation to pragmatism—On rorty’s critique of epistemological philosophy Abstract Rorty believes that the whole traditional philosophy is，since the ancient Greece， a kind of foundational philosophy. Its basic features are known. It argues that any part of the culture only refer to the foundation in order to get real understanding, we only refer to the foundation in order to understand our culture.Rorty against this kind of understanding.by Silas and Quinn, he introduces a holistic and pragmatic understanding on knowledge. According to this understanding, the function of philosophy is not known, but edification. The purpose of edification is to maintain a conversation, rather than discover objective truth. To do this, we need to dialogue with people living in different cultures and different historical periods. Thus, we constantly to describe the world, to reinvent ourselves, to make us to become better and more interesting and more effective. This paper consists of four parts of the introduction and three chapters.The first part is introduction, overview the rorty’s leap from foundation to pragmatism .The first chapter examines the rorty’s critique of modern philosophy. The second chapter investigates the two means of Rortys criticism of traditional philosophy: Sellars’s critique of the ‘Myth of the Given and Quine’s attack on analysis. The third chapter discusses the rortys theory of pragmatism. key words:The invention of mind Epistemological behaviorism Edification Ethnocentrism