市值影响下基于质量成本信息不对称的供应链绩效分析-supply chain performance analysis based on asymmetric quality cost information under the influence of market value.docx

市值影响下基于质量成本信息不对称的供应链绩效分析-supply chain performance analysis based on asymmetric quality cost information under the influence of market value.docx

市值影响下基于质量成本信息不对称的供应链绩效分析-supply chain performance analysis based on asymmetric quality cost information under the influence of market value

会受市值关注度的影响并随其递增。同时发现在三种情况下,都存在当质量成本信息对称时,低质量成本供应商生产的产品质量水平、订货量,与之交易的零售商收益和供应链的收益都高于高质量成本供应商的产品。而在不对称信息条件下,高质量成本供应商的产品质量水平和订货量会发生扭曲,但是都会受到供应商市值关注度的影响且随市值关注度递增,因此市值关注度可以减缓这种扭曲程度。除此以外,供应商市值关注度也会影响收益。当供应商的市值关注度较低时,零售商收益和供应链收益较低。但是随着市值关注度的增加,零售商和供应链的收益会随之增加,特别是当供应商只关注市值时,零售商与供应链的收益会达到对称信息条件下的最优水平。而供应商的收益则会在当高质量成本供应商所占比例和市值关注度都较小时随市值关注度递增,否则随市值关注度递减。通过比较三种情况发现(1)当供应商更关注市值或产品退货价格较低时,将产品质量水平合同对供应商和零售商都有利;(2)当产品价值较低时,不同的定价策略对买卖双方和供应链的影响很小。关键词:盈余管理;合同公告;市值回报;质量成本信息;市值关注度;质量水平AbstractWiththeprogressiverealizationofsplitsharestructurereform,Chinasstockmarkethasundergoneafundamentalchange.Thegoalsoflistedfirmshavechangedfromappreciationinassetvalueandprofitmaximizationtomarketvaluemaximization.Stockmarketistheimportant“referenceframe”tothemarketsizeandperformanceoflistedcompanies.Itisalsothereflectionofthecorporategovernancestructure,managementabilityandmarketcompetitionability,whicharerelatedtothedevelopmentofthecompany.Thus,listedcompaniespaymoreandmoreattentiontotheirmarketvalue.Inthispaper,weusetheoreticalanalysisandempiricalresearchtoexploretheimpactofthemarketvalueconcernonthesupplychaindecisionsandperformancebasedontherealearningmanagement,supplychaincoordinationandcontractstheory.Thenweexplainthedecisionincentiveofthesupplychainmanagementanddesignreasonablecontractstoimprovethesupplychainperformance.WestudythestockmarketreactionafterlistedcompaniespublishedthepurchasesandsalescontractannouncementbasedondatacollectedfromthetwomajorstockexchangesinChina.Wefoundthatcontractannouncementsareassociatedwithastatisticallysignificantandpositiveimpactonthestockmarket;announcementsofsalescontracts,especially,elicitmorepositivestockreactionsthanpurchasingcontractannouncements.Becausetheprospectiveprofitofthesuppliercanbeidentifiedbysalescontracts,investorshavemoreconfidenceinasupplier’sprofitability,whilethebuyer’sprofitabilityisuncertainduetofluctuatingdemandandinventorycost.Thus,investorspreferthefirmwhoannouncessalescontractsoverthoseannouncingpurchasingcontracts.Weinvestigatedse

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