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Corporate Governance, Insider Trading and Management Earnings Forecasts Error
Abstract: This paper investigates the association between insider trading and management earnings forecasts error
of listed companies in China, and considering that effective corporate governance can protect the benefits of
shareholders, we also studies the impacts of corporate governance on the sensitivity of insider trading and
management earnings forecasts. The findings suggest that as concern mangers’ purchasing their own firm’s shares,
underestimation of earnings forecasts is preferred, and for managers’ and large shareholders’ sales, companies
prefer to overstate earnings forecasts. Furthermore, when managements hold high stake of their own firm’s shares,
chairman of directors’ board, CEO or CFO trade their own firm’s shares, and there is duality for chairman of
directors’ board and CEO, the more mangers purchase and sell their own firms’ shares, the more they understate
and overstate earnings forecasts; for large shareh
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