罗伯特·S.平狄克-微观经济学（第九版）PindyckPPT_Ch.17.pptxVIP

MICROECONOMICSby Robert S. Pindyck Daniel RubinfeldNinth EditionCopyright ? 2016, 2012, 2009 Pearson Education, Inc. All Rights Reserved Chapter 17Markets with Asymmetric InformationCHAPTER OUTLINE17.1 Quality, Uncertainty and the Market for Lemons17.2 Market Signaling17.3 Moral Hazard17.4 The Principal–Agent Problem17.5 Managerial Incentives in an Integrated Firm17.6 Asymmetric Information in Labor Markets: Efficiency Wage TheoryLIST OF EXAMPLES17.1 Medicare 17.2 Lemons in Major League Baseball17.3 Working into the Night17.4 Reducing Moral Hazard: Warranties of Animal Health17.5 CEO Salaries17.6 Managers of Nonprofit Hospitals as Agents17.7 Efficiency Wages at Ford Motor Company 17.1 Quality Uncertainty and the Market for Lemons (1 of 8)asymmetric information Situation in which a buyer and a seller possess different information about a transaction.Used cars sell for much less than new cars because there is asymmetric information about their quality: The seller of a used car knows much more about the car than the prospective buyer does. As a result, the prospective buyer will always be suspicious of its quality—and with good reason.The markets for insurance, financial credit, and even employment are also characterized by asymmetric information about product quality. 17.1 Quality Uncertainty and the Market for Lemons (2 of 8)The Market for Used CarsSuppose two kinds of used cars are available—high-quality cars and low-quality cars. Also suppose that both sellers and buyers can tell which kind of car is which. There will then be two markets.In reality, the seller of a used car knows much more about its quality than a buyer does.When making a purchase, buyers therefore view all cars as “medium quality,” in the sense that there is an equal chance of getting a high-quality or a low-quality car. However, fewer high-quality cars and more low-quality cars will now be sold.As consumers begin to realize that most cars sold (about three-fourths of the total) are low quality, t