《中国碳排放权初始配额分配机制研究-论文》.pdfVIP

EconomicManagementIournal December2013Volume2 Issue5，PP．167—175 ResearchonAdverseSelectioninInitialQuota AllocationofCarbonEmissionTrading LihongYu YifanZhou SchoolofBusiness，EastChinaUniversityofScienceandTechnology,DepartmentofEconomics，200237，SHANGHAI，CHINA Email：ylhcumt@vip．sina．com Abstract AseriesofpoliciesproposedbyChinatocopewithclimatechangehasbeengraduallyadvnacing．AsCDMprojectshavepotential problems，theestablishmentofcarbonemissionstradingmrakethasbecomehtepriority．However,how todistributehteinitial quota ishtekey nad difficulty in htecarbon tradingmechanism design．Astheworld’Slargestcrabontradingmanet,EU greenhousegasemissionstradingsystem (EUETS)whichtakesfreeinitialquotaallocationhas encounteredsomeproblems，such as quotasupplysurplus，priceshapr fall，etc，mainlyresultingfrom informationasymmetrybetweengovernmentandenterprisesin theprocessofnegotiating，whichmakesgovernmentdiffi culttopressurehardconstraintsontohteenterprisesintheprocessof emissionreductionanddistributionoftheinitialquota．Thispaperemployedreversechoicehteorytonaalyzehtecausesofhtis kind ofproblems，na dhtenputforwradmenutypereductioncontractbasedonhtetechnicalcharacteristicsoftheemissions reduction，SOas to realizediscriminatingtheenteprrisetype，srtengthenreduction constraintenterprisesface，na dimprovethe regulationeffect． Keywords：CarbonEmissionsTrading；InformationAsymmetry；AdverseSelection；InformationScreening 中国碳排放权初始配额分配机制研究木 于立宏，周一帆 华东理工大学 商学院，上海200237 摘 要 ：中国应对气候变化的一系列政策正在逐步推进。随着CDM项目的日渐势微，建立碳排放权交易市场成为最主要 的政策工具。然而，在碳交易机制设计中，初始配额如何分配既是重点又是难点。采取免费分配初始配额方式的欧盟遇 到了配额供给过剩、价格大幅下跌等问题，主要原因是政府和企业在协商谈判过程 中的信息不对称，使得政府在制定减 排 目标和分配初始配额时难 以对企业施加硬约束。本文运用逆向选择理论分析 了上述问题的成因，并提出可以基于减排 的技术特性而设计菜单式减排合约，以实现企业类型的甄别 ，强化企业面临的减排约束 ，