基于共识程度的双体博弈纳什均衡拓展研究.pdfVIP

Vo l. 8 No.2 管理学报 第 8 卷第 2 期 2011 年 2 月 Chinese Journal of Management Feb.2011 基于共识程度的双体博弈纳什均衡拓展研究 谭伟谭德庆 (西南交通大学经济管理学院) 摘要:首先对一般双体博弈的策略进行拓展，提出共识纳什均衡的概念，并证明其存在 性;根据共识程度的降低提出其他 3 种拓展形式一一近似共识纳什均衡、局部共识纳什均衡和 局部近相共识纳什均衡，并举例进行说明;然后，对各种均衡形式下的合作效率进行分析和比 较。研究表明，共识纳什均衡的利益分配是基于信息本身一一竞争环境的特殊形式，它是具有 效率的。其他 3 种形式均衡的效率低于共识纳什均衡，但仍高于双体博弈纳什均衡。共识纳 什均衡和其他 3 种形式的均衡为参与人组织更具效率的合作提供了渠道和理论解择。 关键词:双体博弈;合作博弈;共识;共识纳什均衡 中圈分类号: C93 ;F224 文献标识码:A 文章编号: 1672-884X(2011 )02-0306-05 Development of Nash Equilibria of Biform Games Based on Degree of Common Knowledge T AN Wei T AN Deqing (Southwest liaotong University. Chengdu. China) Abstract: The paper firstly develops the general strategies of biform games. proposes the concept of common knowledge Nash equilibrium (CKNE). and then presents the proof of its existence. The paper proposes other three forms of equilibria-almost common knowledge Nash equilibrium (ACKNE). part Common knowledge Nash equilibrium(PCKNE) and part almost common knowledge Nash equilibrium(PACKNE). and gives some examples. It also analyzes the efficiencies of different equilibria. Research results show that the distribution of benefit in CKNE is partly decided by the in- formation itself-a special form of competition environment. and it is efficient. The efficiency of three other forms of equilibria is lower than CKNE. but still higher than Nash equilibrium(NE) of biform games. The four developed forms of biform games equilibria can provide methods and theoretical ex- planation for organizing more efficient cooperation. Key words: biform games; coo