股权激励下双重声誉的国企经营者博弈合同分析.pdfVIP

2011/08 总第 412 期 商业研究 COMMERCIAL RESEARCH 文章编号: 1∞1 -148X (2011) 08 -0112-06 股权激励下双重声誉的国企经营者博弈合同分析 -1 L 峰，宋国平 (华北电力大学经济与管理学院，河北保定 071∞3) 摘要:由于所有权与经营权的分离，国有企业委托人和代理人之间存在利益冲突。如何设计一个 合理的激励合同来消除两者之间的利益冲突，是委托代理理论遇到的一个重要理论问题。本文结 合国有企业经营者双重身份的特点，在经营者市场声誉和政治声誉的双重声誉下，以股权激励报酬 为例对委托人与代理人之间的最优合同进行研究，认为最优激励程度与经理人风险规避系数、企业 业绩波动性及各种努力的成本系数成反比，与努力之间的相关性成正比;随着短期努力对当期业绩 的贡献系数和长期业绩对当期业绩的负效应系数的增大，最优激励水平不断弱化。 关键词:股权激励;政治声誉;市场声誉;最优合同 中图分类号: F272.91 文献标识码:A The Game Contract Analysis of 由eS饵.te - owned Enterpriser Managers Based on Double Reputation and Stock Optio皿Incentive KONG Feng , SONG Guo - ping (Sc.加ol 01 EcollOmics and Managerrrerú , North China Electric Power Univer町， Bωding 071∞3 ， China) Abstract: As a result of the 8e阳刚ion betw回n the prope町 rightø and the right of management , the interestø of the principal and agent exist conflict. How ωdesign a 陀四nahle incentive contractøωeliminate the conflict of interestø be- tween the principal - agent 曲曲ry is an impo血nt theoretical problem. Combining 明白白e state - owned enterprise op- erators characteristics of dual identity , under the dual reputation of market reputation and political reputation , taking stock options compensation as 侃ample，出e paper studies the optimal contract between the principal and 也e 略ent. It shows the optimal incentive degr四 is negativelyωrrelated with the fj饵tors of manager risk aversion αJefficient ， enter- prise perform皿ce and alI kinds of the effort c帽t coefficient. And Oplimal incentive degree is positively correlated with 由e correlation α洲efficient between effortø. And wi出 the effectωefficient which reflectø the relationship between the op- erat