基本养老保险制度对个人退休行为的激励程度研究.pdfVIP

第 29 卷第9 期 统计研究 , N队 Vol.29 2012 年月 Statistical Research Sep. 2012 基本养老保险制度对个人退体 行为的激励程度研究 彭浩然 内容提要:退休制度改革的一个关键问题是基本养老保险制度对个人退休行为的激励程度。作者通过测算九 大行业代表性个体在不同退休年龄的养老保险替代率和边际隐性税率，得到以下结论:我国现行基本养老保险制 度对个人退休行为存在普遍的负面激励作用，即会增加提前退休行为出现的概率，并且这种负面激励作用存在着 很大的行业差异性，低收入行业的职工面临着更严重的负面激励。在这些结论的基础上，作者对弹性退休制度的 精算中性原则进行了反思，并建议我国在进行弹性退休制度设计时，既要消除养老保险制度的负激励作用，又要注 意保护低收入行业职工的权益。 关键词:基本养老保险制度;退休行为;边际隐性税率;替代率 中图分类号:凹22.3 文献标识码:A 文章编号:1002 -4565(2012)09 -0031 -06 The Incentive Effect of China s Basic Pension System on Individual Retirement Behavior Peng Haoran Abstract: A critical question in retirement system reform is the incentive effect of basic pension system on individual retirement behavior. In this paper , we calculate the replacement rate and marginal implicit tax rate of representative individuals of nine industries at various retirement ages. The results indicate that there generally exists negative incentive effect of China s current basic pension system on individual retirement behavior , which will increase the possibility of early retir可ment. In addition , this negative incentive effect varies across industries , and workers in low-income industries face severer negative incentive. Based on these results , we make retrospection about the principle of actuarially neutral in flexible retirement , and suggest that it is vital to diminish such negative incentive of basic pension system and protect