基于公司治理视角的资本结构研究会计学专业论文.docxVIP

II II Abstract Abstract Since the birth of MM theory, the capital structure theory of corporation has been one of the focuses of the field of economics. The early development of capital structure theory have experienced three stages: net profit theory, net business profit theory and traditional theory. In the modern corporate finance, the study of corporate financing behavior and capital structure management begins with MM theory. But as we know, the capital market is not perfect. Many economics make search on the precondition of MM theory, and continually put forth asymmetric information theory, right of control theory, strategic corporate and behavioral corporate finance. According to modern capital structure theory, firms usually raise their finance in pecking order: internal equity financing, debt financing, and then external equity financing. Corporate governance is a emerging research field. Capital structure is more and more important among the research of corporate governance, and it is decisive of corporate governance structure, it not only decide the right of control of firms, also the purpose of corporate governance, the mode of corporate governance, and the result of corporate governance. In all, there are two kinds of representative corporate governance theories: the “shareholder with sovereign right” theory in U.S.A, the “administrator leading” theory in Japan. Through study on capital structure of the two countries, it shows: the two countries have raised their finance in pecking order. The listed companies in China have their unique characteristics: high level of current liability, low level of long-term liability and to have obvious preference of equity financing, they show a totally opposite financing structure with the modern capital structure as a whole because of the factors of system and sectors in China. The capital structure in listed company obstruct market and creditor to manage the firms, and it have caused the result: “internal person”