高管薪酬的司法介入美、英、澳之比较.pdfVIP

第34 卷第2 期 Vol. 34 , No. 2 大连理工大学学报(社会科学版) 2013 年 4 月 Journal of Dalian University of Technology (Social Sciences) Apr. 2 0 1 3 高管薪酬的司法介入:美、英、澳之比较 张锋学1 ，官欣荣2 ( 1.广东农工商职业技术学院管理系，广东广州 510507; 2. 华南理工大学法学院，广东广州 510640 ) 摘 要:文章以司法介入为视角，考察了美国薪酬正当性审查的三大标准一-白我交易、违反注意义务、浪费公司 财产，指出其与尊崇市场自治的司法理念、BjR的问责机制、相对发达的股东诉讼文化一起共同构成了美国中级 宽 容型的司法审查模式，而与英国低级一放任型模式、澳大利亚高级一管制型模式有所分殊。这些国外模式的优秀 基因为我国淡去行政规制过度化的路径依赖，确立一种混合型的司法审查模式，提供了有益的借鉴。 关键词:离管g 薪酬;司法介入; ~t较 中图分类号: 0913 文献标识码:A 文章编号: l008-407X(2013)02-0092-06 Judicial Intervention of the Executive Compensation: the United States , Britain and Australia ZHANG Feng-xue 1 , GUAN Xin-rong 2 ( 1. Department of Management , Guangdong Aib Polytechnic College , Guangzhou 510507 , China; 2. School of Law , South China University of Techonology , Guangzhou 510640 , China.) Abstract: The paper ,from a perspective of judicial intervention , examines the remuneration of the legitimacy of the three standards of review: self-dealing , breach of duty of care , waste of corporate property , indicating that with the judicial philosophy of the autonomy of the market , BJR accountability mechanisms , and the relative developed culture of shareholder litigation , the judicial intervention in the U. S. has formed an intermediate lev- el: a judicial review modelof tolerance , to be diHerent from a laissez-faire model of the British low-level , and a control model of the Australia high-leve l. The excellent genes of these foreign models provide