黄新飞 《微观经济学》Chapter_11_Uncertainty_and_Game_Theory.pptVIP

* A $200 B $150 $100 -$20 C -$30 D* $10 $150 $10 Sax’s price High price Normal price High price Normal price Berney’s price Game of Competition * Nash equilibrium * A* $0 B+ -$100 $0 NI=$5000 $800 NI=$4400 C+ $600 D $300 -$50 NI=$4500 $250 NI=$4000 Billy’s strategy Competitive output Low output Competitive output Low output Betsy’s strategy Game of Invisible Hand * Competition + Unilateral (单方面的) low output * A $0 B+ -$100 $0 NI=$5000 $800 NI=$4400 C+ $600 D++ $300 -$50 NI=$4500 $250 NI=$4000 Billy’s strategy Competitive output Low output Competitive output Low output Betsy’s strategy Game of Collusion ++ Monopolistic collusion * A $100 B $120 $100 -$30 C -$30 D* $100 $120 $100 U.S. Steel Low pollution High pollution Low pollution High pollution Oxy Steel Game of Pollution * Nash equilibrium * A Loss B Threatened Loss hegemony C hegemony D Benefit Threatened Benefit Union of Soviet Arms?Race Peace Arms? Race Peace U.S.A Game of Arms?Race * Worker in standard industry A $50 B $300 $50 NI=$100 $50 NI=$350 C $50 D $300 $200 NI=$250 $0 NI=$300 Winner Work in winner-take-all industry Worker in standard industry Work in winner-take-all industry Runner-Up Game of Winner-Take-All A: dull; B: efficient; D: overcrowded * Credibility A key feature in many games is the attempt of players to built credibility (信誉). You are credible if you are expected to keep your promises and carry out your threats. But you cannot gain credibility with simple promises. * Case 1张维迎的“农村父女博弈” 问题：父亲发出的“与女儿断绝关系”的威胁是否值得相信？ ① 两全齐美 ② 失去情人 讨厌小子 两全齐美 ③ 失去父亲 ④ 失去一切 失去女儿 失去女儿 断绝 妥协 私奔 放弃 女 父 * 课堂测试 解释下列每个事件如何改变市场均衡状态下的保费和保单数量 1.在同一条贸易路线上行驶并因此同样风险的商船数量增加 2.市场上所有船主厌恶风险程度增加 3.所有投资者厌恶风险程度增加 4.影响总体经济的风险增加 课堂测试 已知某垄断厂商的成本函数为TC=5Q2+100Q，产品的需求函数为P=900-5Q，请计算： ①利润及大时的产量、价格和利润； ②假设国内市场的售价超过600时，国外同质产品就会进入，计算P=600时垄断厂商提供的产量和赚得的利润； ③如果政府进行限价，规定最高售价为500，计算垄断厂商提供的产量和赚得的利润；此时国内需求状况会发生什么变化； ④基于以上结论说明政府制定反垄断法规的经济学意义。 19 3 Chapter 11 Uncertainty and Game Theory 黄新飞 International Busines